Choosing for Europe: Judicial Incentives and Legal Integration in the European Union

34 Pages Posted: 3 Mar 2017 Last revised: 10 May 2019

See all articles by Nicolas Lampach

Nicolas Lampach

KU Leuven - Centre for Legal Theory and Empirical Jurisprudence

Arthur Dyevre

Leuven Centre for Empirical Jurisprudence

Date Written: March 2, 2017

Abstract

We investigate the factors influencing the choice of domestic judges to pass on cases to the Court of Justice of the European Union. While EU judicial scholars have typically relied on integration theory or ad hoc theories of adjudication to explain referral activity, our theoretical framework draws on general judicial decision making theory and focuses on the incentives and constraints national judges face when deciding whether to submit a references to the Court of Justice. Consistent with our rationalist account of judging, we find empirical evidence that the rate at which national courts refer cases is influenced by familiarity with EU law, power-seeking motives and political fragmentation.

Keywords: European Court of Justice, Fixed effects negative binomial regression, Judicial behaviour, Legal integration

JEL Classification: C26, C11, K10, K40, N34

Suggested Citation

Lampach, Nicolas and Dyevre, Arthur, Choosing for Europe: Judicial Incentives and Legal Integration in the European Union (March 2, 2017). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2926496 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2926496

Nicolas Lampach

KU Leuven - Centre for Legal Theory and Empirical Jurisprudence ( email )

Tiensestraat 41
Leuven, B-3000
Belgium

Arthur Dyevre (Contact Author)

Leuven Centre for Empirical Jurisprudence ( email )

Tiensestraat 41
Leuven, B-3000
Belgium
+32492971322 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.arthurdyevre.org

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