Systematic Longevity Risk: To Bear or to Insure?

48 Pages Posted: 3 Mar 2017 Last revised: 29 Jul 2018

See all articles by Ling-Ni Boon

Ling-Ni Boon

Tilburg University

Marie Briere

Amundi Asset Management; Paris Dauphine University; Université Libre de Bruxelles

Bas J. M. Werker

Tilburg University - Center for Economic Research (CentER)

Date Written: June 1, 2018


We compare two contracts for managing systematic longevity risk in retirement: a collective arrangement that distributes the risk among participants, and a market-provided annuity contract. We evaluate the contracts’ appeal with respect to the retiree’s welfare, and the viability of the market solution through the financial reward to the annuity provider’s equityholders. We find that individuals find it more attractive to bear longevity risk under a collective arrangement than to insure it with a life insurers’annuity contract subject to insolvency risk (albeit small). Under realistic capital provision hypotheses, the annuity provider is incapable of adequately compensating its equity holders for bearing systematic longevity risk.

Keywords: longevity risk, group self-annuitization (GSA), insurance, variable annuity

JEL Classification: D14, E21, G22, G23

Suggested Citation

Boon, Ling-Ni and Briere, Marie and Werker, Bas J.M., Systematic Longevity Risk: To Bear or to Insure? (June 1, 2018). Available at SSRN: or

Ling-Ni Boon

Tilburg University ( email )

P.O. Box 90153
Tilburg, 5000 LE

Marie Briere (Contact Author)

Amundi Asset Management ( email )

90 Boulevard Pasteur
Paris, 75015

Paris Dauphine University ( email )

Université Libre de Bruxelles ( email )


Bas J.M. Werker

Tilburg University - Center for Economic Research (CentER) ( email )

Econometrics and Finance Group
5000 LE Tilburg

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