Public Goods Games and Psychological Utility: Theory and Evidence

45 Pages Posted: 8 Mar 2017

See all articles by Sanjit Dhami

Sanjit Dhami

University of Leicester

Mengxing Wei

University of Leicester - Division of Economics, School of Business, Students

Ali al-Nowaihi

University of Leicester - Department of Economics

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: January 20, 2017

Abstract

We consider a public goods game which incorporates guilt-aversion/surprise-seeking and the attribution of intentions behind these emotions (Battigalli and Dufwenberg, 2007; Khalmetski et al., 2015). We implement the induced beliefs method (Ellingsen et al., 2010) and a within-subjects design using the strategy method. Previous studies mainly use dictator games - whose results may not be robust to adding strategic components. We find that guilt-aversion is far more important than surprise-seeking; and that the attribution of intentions behind guilt-aversion/surprise-seeking is important. Our between-subjects analysis confirms the results of the within-subjects design.

Keywords: Public goods games, psychological game theory, surprise-seeking/guilt-aversion, attribution of intentions, induced beliefs method, within and between subjects designs.

JEL Classification: D01 (Microeconomic Behavior), D03 (Behavioral Microeconomics), H41 (Public Goods).

Suggested Citation

Dhami, Sanjit and Wei, Mengxing and al-Nowaihi, Ali, Public Goods Games and Psychological Utility: Theory and Evidence (January 20, 2017). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2927557 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2927557

Sanjit Dhami (Contact Author)

University of Leicester ( email )

Department of Economics
Leicester LE1 7RH, Leicestershire LE1 7RH
United Kingdom

HOME PAGE: http://www2.le.ac.uk/departments/economics/people/sdhami

Mengxing Wei

University of Leicester - Division of Economics, School of Business, Students ( email )

United Kingdom

Ali Al-Nowaihi

University of Leicester - Department of Economics ( email )

Department of Economics
Leicester LE1 7RH, Leicestershire LE1 7RH
United Kingdom

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