The Effect of Compliance Time in Patent Examination: An Experimental Study

42 Pages Posted: 9 Mar 2017

See all articles by Sven Fischer

Sven Fischer

University of Newcastle - Economics

Marco Kleine

Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition

Daniel John Zizzo

University of Queensland - School of Economics

Date Written: March 8, 2017

Abstract

Using controlled and incentivized decision experiments, we explore whether the length of compliance periods in patent examinations affects behaviour and the overall efficiency of the system. In our stylized experiments, participants decide in the role of a patentee who faces uncertainty about the prospects of the application and must invest real effort over an extended period of time, in order to reach a minimum threshold. Overall, we find some evidence that a very long time horizon outperforms a short one.

Keywords: Deadlines, certification, behaviour, real effort, investment, sunk cost fallacy

JEL Classification: C91, D02, D83

Suggested Citation

Fischer, Sven and Kleine, Marco and Zizzo, Daniel John, The Effect of Compliance Time in Patent Examination: An Experimental Study (March 8, 2017). Max Planck Institute for Innovation & Competition Research Paper No. 17-05, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2927925 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2927925

Sven Fischer (Contact Author)

University of Newcastle - Economics ( email )

Newcastle-upon-Tyne NE1 7RU
United Kingdom

Marco Kleine

Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition ( email )

Marstallplatz 1
Munich, Bayern 80539
Germany

Daniel John Zizzo

University of Queensland - School of Economics ( email )

St Lucia
Brisbane, Queensland 4072
Australia

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