'Home Sweet Home' versus International Tax Planning: Where Do Multinational Firms Hold Their U.S. Trademarks?

39 Pages Posted: 7 Mar 2017

See all articles by Jost H. Heckemeyer

Jost H. Heckemeyer

University of Kiel - Faculty of Economics and Social Sciences; ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research

Pia Olligs

University of Cologne

Michael Overesch

Universität zu Köln

Date Written: February 24, 2017

Abstract

This study analyzes whether tax incentives play a role in the geographical allocation of U.S. trademark rights within large multinational enterprises. Considering the S&P 500 firms, we find a strong home country concentration of U.S. trademark ownership. Still, the probability to offshore legal ownership of U.S. trademarks increases with the value of the respective trademark and with the international footprint of the firm. Considering the choice in which country to hold the trademark, host country taxes turn out to have a statistically significant influence. In an additional analysis, we show that our main results also carry over to European multinationals.

Keywords: Trademark, Corporate Tax, Location Choice, Multinational Firm

JEL Classification: H25, H26, H32

Suggested Citation

Heckemeyer, Jost H. and Olligs, Pia and Overesch, Michael, 'Home Sweet Home' versus International Tax Planning: Where Do Multinational Firms Hold Their U.S. Trademarks? (February 24, 2017). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2927926 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2927926

Jost H. Heckemeyer

University of Kiel - Faculty of Economics and Social Sciences ( email )

Kiel
Germany

ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research ( email )

P.O. Box 10 34 43
L 7,1
D-68034 Mannheim, 68034
Germany

Pia Olligs

University of Cologne ( email )

Albertus-Magnus-Platz
Cologne, 50923
Germany

Michael Overesch (Contact Author)

Universität zu Köln ( email )

Albertus-Magnus-Platz
WiSo-Gebäude
Cologne, 50923
Germany
0221/470-5605 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.steuer.uni-koeln.de/

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