Electoral Cycles Among U.S. Courts of Appeals Judges

Abstract

We find field evidence consistent with experimental studies that document the contexts and characteristics making individuals more susceptible to priming. Just before U.S. Presidential elections, judges on the U.S. Courts of Appeals double the rate at which they dissent and vote along partisan lines. Increases are accentuated for judges with less experience and in polarized environments. During periods of national unity — wartime, for example — judges suppress dissents, again, especially by judges with less experience and in polarized environments. We show the dissent rate increases gradually from 6% to nearly 12% in the quarter before an election and returns immediately to 6% after the election. If highly experienced professionals making common law precedent can be politically primed, it raises questions about the perceived impartiality of the judiciary.

Keywords: Electoral Cycles, Judges, Courts, Wartime, Presidential Elections, Dissents

JEL Classification: D03, G02, D8