Non-Confrontational Extremists

TSE Working Paper No. 16-694

85 Pages Posted: 7 Mar 2017 Last revised: 10 Feb 2020

See all articles by Daniel L. Chen

Daniel L. Chen

Directeur de Recherche, Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, Toulouse School of Economics, Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse, University of Toulouse Capitole, Toulouse, France

Moti Michaeli

Hebrew University of Jerusalem - Center for the Study of Rationality

Daniel Spiro

Uppsala University, Dept. of Economics

Date Written: September 21, 2019

Abstract

Preference falsification, the act of misrepresenting one’s beliefs under social pressure, is widespread but not ubiquitous. We show that when individuals perceive a concave cost of deviating from their principles, ideological extremists are more likely to falsify preferences. Being in ideological minority, they cave-in on decisions they disagree with ideologically because once they deviate slightly, further deviations entail relatively little additional cost. To this result—ideological perfectionism—which is supported by recent lab experiments, we add the first evidence in a high-stakes field setting regarding which individuals, on an ideological scale, conform under social pressure and which stand their ground.

Keywords: Judicial Decision Making, Group Decision Making, Ideology, Peer Pressure

JEL Classification: D7, K0, Z1

Suggested Citation

Chen, Daniel L. and Michaeli, Moti and Spiro, Daniel, Non-Confrontational Extremists (September 21, 2019). TSE Working Paper No. 16-694, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2928229

Daniel L. Chen (Contact Author)

Directeur de Recherche, Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, Toulouse School of Economics, Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse, University of Toulouse Capitole, Toulouse, France ( email )

Toulouse School of Economics
1, Esplanade de l'Université
Toulouse, 31080
France

Moti Michaeli

Hebrew University of Jerusalem - Center for the Study of Rationality ( email )

Givat Ram
Jerusalem
Israel

Daniel Spiro

Uppsala University, Dept. of Economics ( email )

Box 513
Uppsala, 751 20
Sweden

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