Non-Confrontational Extremists

TSE Working Paper No. 16-694

117 Pages Posted: 7 Mar 2017 Last revised: 26 Dec 2018

See all articles by Daniel L. Chen

Daniel L. Chen

Directeur de Recherche, Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, Toulouse School of Economics, Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse, University of Toulouse Capitole, Toulouse, France

Moti Michaeli

Hebrew University of Jerusalem - Center for the Study of Rationality

Daniel Spiro

Uppsala University, Dept. of Economics

Date Written: October 13, 2018

Abstract

In many contexts individuals are subject to norms and decisions they disagree with ideologically. What is the effect of regularly being in ideological minority on the propensity to confront majority norms and decisions? We study this in an ideologically-salient field setting – US appeals courts – using exogenous predictors of ideology and random assignment of judges. We find that ideological interaction silences extremists: judges who are ideologically extreme relative to their peers are less confrontational – dissent less often – than other judges despite shaping court decisions the least. Considering many mechanisms, we find that a model of peer pressure can explain the observations.









Keywords: Judicial Decision Making, Group Decision Making, Ideology, Peer Pressure

JEL Classification: D7, K0, Z1

Suggested Citation

Chen, Daniel L. and Michaeli, Moti and Spiro, Daniel, Non-Confrontational Extremists (October 13, 2018). TSE Working Paper No. 16-694. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2928229

Daniel L. Chen (Contact Author)

Directeur de Recherche, Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, Toulouse School of Economics, Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse, University of Toulouse Capitole, Toulouse, France ( email )

21 allée de Brienne
31015 Toulouse cedex 6 France
Toulouse, 31015
France

Moti Michaeli

Hebrew University of Jerusalem - Center for the Study of Rationality ( email )

Givat Ram
Jerusalem
Israel

Daniel Spiro

Uppsala University, Dept. of Economics ( email )

Box 513
Uppsala, 751 20
Sweden

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