Loanable Funds, Monitoring and Banking

Posted: 9 Jun 2002

See all articles by Huberto M. Ennis

Huberto M. Ennis

Federal Reserve Banks - Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond

Abstract

This paper studies financial intermediation in a general equilibrium overlapping generations model. Indivisible investment projects combine with informational imperfections to create a (hidden action) moral hazard problem and introduce a role for third-party monitoring. Agency costs at the intermediary level are also considered. Under some conditions, monitors can be viewed as banks facing a non-trivial portfolio diversification problem. Equilibria are derived in which a large nationwide bank coexists with a number of community-regional banks, a structure of strong empirical relevance. Policies such as a mandatory reserve requirement are shown to have substantial effects on the levels of investment in the economy.

JEL Classification: E44, G21, G28

Suggested Citation

Ennis, Huberto M., Loanable Funds, Monitoring and Banking. European Finance Review, Vol. 5, No. 1-2. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=292952

Huberto M. Ennis (Contact Author)

Federal Reserve Banks - Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond ( email )

P.O. Box 27622
Richmond, VA 23261
United States

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