Skew and Implied Leverage Effect: Smile Dynamics Revisited

12 Pages Posted: 9 Mar 2017

See all articles by Vincent Vargas

Vincent Vargas

Ecole Normale Superiéure (ENS)

Tung-Lam Dao

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Jean-Philippe Bouchaud

Capital Fund Management

Date Written: March 8, 2017

Abstract

We revisit the "Smile Dynamics" problem, which consists in relating the implied leverage (i.e. the correlation of the at-the-money volatility with the returns of the underlying) and the skew of the option smile. The ratio between these two quantities, called "Skew-Stickiness Ratio" (SSR) by Bergomi, saturates to the value 2 for linear models in the limit of small maturities, and converges to 1 for long maturities. We show that for more general, non-linear models (such as the asymmetric GARCH model), Bergomi's result must be modified, and can be larger than 2 for small maturities. The discrepancy comes from the fact that the volatility skew is, in general, different from the skewness of the underlying. We compare our theory with empirical results, using data both from option markets and from the underlying price series, for the S&P500 and the DAX. We find, among other things, that although both the implied leverage and the skew appear to be too strong on option markets, their ratio is well explained by the theory. We observe that the SSR indeed becomes larger than 2 for small maturities, signalling the presence of non-linear effects.

Keywords: skew, implied leverage effect, volatility smile, skew-stickiness ratio

Suggested Citation

Vargas, Vincent and Dao, Tung-Lam and Bouchaud, Jean-Philippe, Skew and Implied Leverage Effect: Smile Dynamics Revisited (March 8, 2017). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2929526 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2929526

Vincent Vargas

Ecole Normale Superiéure (ENS)

45 rue d’Ulm
Paris Cedex 05, F-75230
France

Tung-Lam Dao (Contact Author)

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Jean-Philippe Bouchaud

Capital Fund Management ( email )

23 rue de l'Université
Paris, 75007
France
+33 1 49 49 59 20 (Phone)

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