Economics, Public Choice and the Perennial Conflict of Laws

26 Pages Posted: 10 Dec 2001

See all articles by Erin A. O'Hara O'Connor

Erin A. O'Hara O'Connor

Florida State University - College of Law; Gruter Institute for Law and Behavioral Research

Abstract

This piece is a response to an article by Andrew Guzman, which proffers an efficiency framework for choice-of-law problems in interjurisdictional conflicts. The response incorporates insights from public choice theory into choice of law to draw two conclusions. First, public choice theory confounds our attempts to draw normative conclusions about efficient choice-of-law policies. Second, assuming that we can overcome these difficulties to ascertain the content of efficient choice-of-law policies, public choice theory exposes the practical difficulties of moving courts toward more efficient choice-of-law decisions. In short, the problem is both more difficult and more elusive than others, including Guzman, have presupposed.

JEL Classification: K

Suggested Citation

O'Hara O'Connor, Erin A., Economics, Public Choice and the Perennial Conflict of Laws. Georgetown Law Review, 2002. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=293000 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.293000

Erin A. O'Hara O'Connor (Contact Author)

Florida State University - College of Law ( email )

425 W. Jefferson Street
Tallahassee, FL 32306
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.law.fsu.edu/our-faculty/deans/ohara-oconnor

Gruter Institute for Law and Behavioral Research

158 Goya Road
Portola Valley, CA 94028
United States

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