Collective Selection of Representatives and the Democracy Effect

27 Pages Posted: 15 Mar 2017

See all articles by Kenju Kamei

Kenju Kamei

Durham University - Department of Economics and Finance

Date Written: March 13, 2017

Abstract

It is known that being involved in democratic decision-making of a policy affects people’s level of cooperation in dilemma situations, even if selection bias is controlled for. Past experimental work used direct democracy as the form of the decision-making process. But is there such a democracy effect when people democratically select representatives that take some action on behalf of them in the future? We let subjects play a real-effort task in a group and then one representative distributed group total payoffs among their members. The representatives were selected either by subjects’ votes or by the computer randomly in each group. Our data indicates that there is no (or at most negative) impact of representative democracy on subjects’ behavior. This may mean that the democracy effect seen in the past experiments is driven by direct democracy.

Keywords: experiment, cooperation, dilemma, democracy

JEL Classification: C92, D72, D78, H41

Suggested Citation

Kamei, Kenju, Collective Selection of Representatives and the Democracy Effect (March 13, 2017). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2932094 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2932094

Kenju Kamei (Contact Author)

Durham University - Department of Economics and Finance ( email )

Durham, DH1 3HY
United Kingdom

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
36
Abstract Views
319
PlumX Metrics