Disguising Lies - Image Concerns and Partial Lying in Cheating Games

31 Pages Posted: 16 Mar 2017

See all articles by Kiryl Khalmetski

Kiryl Khalmetski

University of Cologne

Dirk Sliwka

University of Cologne - Department of Business Administration and Human Resource Management; IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Date Written: May 2017

Abstract

We study equilibrium reporting behavior in Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013) type cheating games when agents have a fixed cost of lying and image concerns not to be perceived as a liar. We show that equilibria naturally arise in which agents with low costs of lying randomize among a set of the highest potential reports. Such equilibria induce a distribution of reports in line with observed experimental patterns. We also find that higher image concerns lead to an increase in the range of reported lies while the effect of the fixed cost of lying is the opposite.

Keywords: cost of lying, image concerns, cheating game, truth-telling, deception

JEL Classification: D030, D820, D830, C720

Suggested Citation

Khalmetski, Kiryl and Sliwka, Dirk, Disguising Lies - Image Concerns and Partial Lying in Cheating Games (May 2017). CESifo Working Paper Series No. 6347. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2933434

Kiryl Khalmetski

University of Cologne ( email )

Universitätsstraße 22a
Cologne, 50937
Germany

Dirk Sliwka (Contact Author)

University of Cologne - Department of Business Administration and Human Resource Management ( email )

Koln, 50923
Germany

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

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