Behavioural Types in Public Goods Games: A Re-Analysis by Hierarchical Clustering

14 Pages Posted: 21 Mar 2017

See all articles by Francesco Fallucchi

Francesco Fallucchi

University of East Anglia (UEA)

R. Andrew Luccasen, III

Mississippi University for Women (MUW)

Theodore Turocy

University of East Anglia (UEA)

Date Written: January 12, 2017

Abstract

We re-analyse participant behaviour in standard economics experiments studying voluntary contributions to a public good. Previous approaches were based in part on a priori models of decision-making, such as maximising personal earnings, or reciprocating the behaviour of others. Many participants however do not conform to one of these models exactly, requiring ad hoc adjustments to the theoretical baselines to identify them as belonging to a given behavioural type. We construct a typology of behaviour based on a similarity measure between strategies using hierarchical clustering analysis. We identify four clearly distinct behavioural types which together account for over 90% of participants in six experimental studies. The resulting type classification distinguishes behaviour across groups more consistently than previous approaches.

Keywords: behavioral economics, cluster analysis, cooperation, public goods

JEL Classification: C65, C71, H41

Suggested Citation

Fallucchi, Francesco and Luccasen, III, R. Andrew and Turocy, Theodore, Behavioural Types in Public Goods Games: A Re-Analysis by Hierarchical Clustering (January 12, 2017). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2937841 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2937841

Francesco Fallucchi

University of East Anglia (UEA) ( email )

Norwich Research Park
Norwich, Norfolk NR4 7TJ
United Kingdom

R. Andrew Luccasen, III

Mississippi University for Women (MUW) ( email )

1100 College Street
Columbus, MS 39701
United States

Theodore Turocy (Contact Author)

University of East Anglia (UEA) ( email )

Norwich Research Park
Norwich, Norfolk NR4 7TJ
United Kingdom

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