Optimal Disclosure and Fight for Attention

46 Pages Posted: 23 Mar 2017 Last revised: 19 Feb 2019

See all articles by Jan Schneemeier

Jan Schneemeier

Indiana University - Kelley School of Business

Date Written: February 16, 2019

Abstract

In this paper, firm managers use their disclosure policy to direct speculators' scarce attention towards their firm. More attention implies greater outside information and strengthens the feedback effect from stock prices to firm investment. The model highlights a novel trade-off associated with disclosure. While more precise public information crowds out the value of private information, it can also signal high firm quality to the financial market. If the spread between the (unknown) quality of firms is sufficiently high, there is a separating equilibrium with partial disclosure by high-quality firms and no disclosure by low-quality firms. Otherwise, there is a (more efficient) pooling equilibrium without disclosure. Perhaps surprisingly, the introduction of short-run incentives and disclosure caps increases investment efficiency.

Keywords: attention allocation, disclosure, feedback effect, asymmetric information, real efficiency

JEL Classification: D82, D83, G14

Suggested Citation

Schneemeier, Jan, Optimal Disclosure and Fight for Attention (February 16, 2019). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2938045 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2938045

Jan Schneemeier (Contact Author)

Indiana University - Kelley School of Business ( email )

1275 E 10th St
Bloomington, IN 47405
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.jan-schneemeier.com

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