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Do I Care If You Are Paid? A Field Experiment on Charitable Donations

23 Pages Posted: 23 Mar 2017  

Uri Gneezy

University of California, San Diego (UCSD) - Rady School of Management

Holger Andreas Rau

University of Göttingen

Anya Savikhin Samek

Center for Economic and Social Research (CESR); The University of Chicago

Lilia Zhurakhovska

Max Planck Society for the Advancement of the Sciences - Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods; University of Duisburg-Essen

Date Written: March 20, 2017

Abstract

This study investigates how information on solicitors’ compensation affects charitable giving in a door-to-door field experiment with more than 2,800 households. We vary whether solicitors are paid or not and the information about this compensation that potential donors receive. Relative to the treatment in which potential donors are not informed about the solicitor’s compensation, donations increase by 16% when potential donors are informed that solicitors are paid, but are not effected when donors are informed that solicitors are unpaid. The effect is driven by female donors, who increase their donations by 88%. Our findings suggest that if charities pay their solicitors, it could be beneficial to communicate this information to donors.

Keywords: charitable giving, field experiment, information

Suggested Citation

Gneezy, Uri and Rau, Holger Andreas and Samek, Anya Savikhin and Zhurakhovska, Lilia, Do I Care If You Are Paid? A Field Experiment on Charitable Donations (March 20, 2017). CESR-Schaeffer Working Paper No. 2938069. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2938069 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2938069

Uri Gneezy (Contact Author)

University of California, San Diego (UCSD) - Rady School of Management ( email )

9500 Gilman Drive
Rady School of Management
La Jolla, CA 92093
United States

Holger Andreas Rau

University of Göttingen ( email )

Platz der Göttinger Sieben 3
Göttingen, Niedersachsen 37073
Germany

Anya Savikhin Samek

Center for Economic and Social Research (CESR) ( email )

635 Downey Way
Los Angeles, CA 90089-3332
United States

The University of Chicago ( email )

Chicago, IL 60637
United States

Lilia Zhurakhovska

Max Planck Society for the Advancement of the Sciences - Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods ( email )

Kurt-Schumacher-Str. 10
Bonn, 53113
Germany

University of Duisburg-Essen ( email )

Lotharstrasse 1
Duisburg, 47048
Germany

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