CEO-Board Dynamics

70 Pages Posted: 22 Mar 2017 Last revised: 14 Jun 2019

See all articles by John R. Graham

John R. Graham

Duke University; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Hyunseob Kim

Cornell University - Samuel Curtis Johnson Graduate School of Management

Mark T. Leary

Washington University in St. Louis - Olin Business School; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: June 12, 2019

Abstract

We examine CEO-board dynamics using a new panel dataset that spans 1920 to 2011. The long sample allows us to perform within-firm and within-CEO tests over a long horizon, many for the first time in the governance literature. Consistent with theories of bargaining or dynamic contracting, we find board independence increases at CEO turnover and falls with CEO tenure, with the decline stronger following superior performance. CEOs are also more likely to be appointed board chair as tenure increases, and we find evidence consistent with a substitution between board independence and chair duality. Other results suggest that these classes of models fail to capture important elements of board dynamics. First, the magnitude of the CEO tenure effect is economically small, much smaller for example than the strong persistence in board structure that we document. Second, when external CEOs are hired, board independence falls and subsequently increases. Third, event studies document a positive market reaction when powerful CEOs die in office, consistent with powerful CEOs becoming entrenched.

Keywords: Governance, Chief Executive, Board of Directors, Dynamic Contracting, Bargaining, Compensation, Monitoring

JEL Classification: G3, J3, B26, M12

Suggested Citation

Graham, John Robert and Kim, Hyunseob and Leary, Mark T., CEO-Board Dynamics (June 12, 2019). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2938120 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2938120

John Robert Graham (Contact Author)

Duke University ( email )

Box 90120
Durham, NC 27708-0120
United States
919-660-7857 (Phone)
919-660-8030 (Fax)

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Hyunseob Kim

Cornell University - Samuel Curtis Johnson Graduate School of Management ( email )

Ithaca, NY 14853
United States

Mark T. Leary

Washington University in St. Louis - Olin Business School ( email )

One Brookings Drive
Campus Box 1133
St. Louis, MO 63130-4899
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Here is the Coronavirus
related research on SSRN

Paper statistics

Downloads
928
Abstract Views
5,778
rank
26,698
PlumX Metrics