Growth Options, Incentives, and Pay-for-Performance: Theory and Evidence
52 Pages Posted: 23 Mar 2017 Last revised: 30 Nov 2018
Date Written: November 27, 2018
Pay-performance sensitivity is a common proxy for the strength of incentives. We show that growth options create a wedge between expected-pay-effort sensitivity, which determines actual incentives, and pay-performance sensitivity, which is the ratio of expected-pay-effort to performance-effort sensitivity. An increase in growth option intensity can increase performance-effort sensitivity more than expected-pay-effort sensitivity so that as incentives increase, pay-performance sensitivity decreases. We document empirical evidence consistent with this finding. Pay-performance sensitivity, measured by dollar changes in manager wealth over dollar changes in firm value, decreases with proxies for growth option intensity and increases with proxies for growth option exercise.
Keywords: Dynamic Contracting, Real Options, Pay-Performance Sensitivity
JEL Classification: D86, D92, G31, G32, M12
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation