Private Ordering of Shareholder Litigation in the EU and the US
in Sean Griffith, et al., eds., THE ELGAR HANDBOOK FOR REPRESENTATIVE SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION (2017/2018 Forthcoming)
24 Pages Posted: 25 Mar 2017 Last revised: 29 Mar 2017
Date Written: March 23, 2017
As shareholder litigation expands globally and increases in economic significance, so does the interest of parties in fighting over the rules that govern it and determine its scope. Sometimes this fight is over legislative or regulatory limits, but it can also occur in the context of private ordering. To what extent can the players in shareholder litigation — companies, management, shareholders, and other investors — set the rules for litigation through private agreement? This chapter takes a comparative approach to private ordering of shareholder litigation. It begins with the U.S. example, in which dispute resolution provisions emerged in the constituent documents of U.S. companies as a response to pressures from litigation. The chapter then examines how private ordering of shareholder litigation — both intracorporate and securities suits — might function (or not) in the context of the E.U. and some of its constituent countries.
Keywords: shareholder litigation, litigation bylaws, dispute resolution, derivative suits, securities litigation,EU securities litigation, comparative litigation, corporate litigation, intracorporate litigation
JEL Classification: K10, K22
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation