Electoral Thresholds as Coordination Devices

29 Pages Posted: 26 Mar 2017

See all articles by Matias Nuñez

Matias Nuñez

Université Paris Dauphine

Dimitrios Xefteris

University of Cyprus

Date Written: April 2017

Abstract

In this paper, we study one‐person–one‐vote parliamentary elections where voters care both about the winner of elections and about the composition of the parliament. Parties enter the parliament if and only if their vote share exceeds some predetermined threshold. We show that equilibria generically exist in which all parties obtain a non‐degenerate vote‐share and, perhaps more importantly, we show that the size of the electoral threshold acts as a coordination device, which crucially affects the win prospects of the Condorcet winner party. In particular, we argue that the win prospects of the Condorcet winner party decrease with the size of the entry threshold.

Keywords: Entry threshold, Poisson games, strategic voting

JEL Classification: D7, H1

Suggested Citation

Nuñez, Matias and Xefteris, Dimitrios, Electoral Thresholds as Coordination Devices (April 2017). The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Vol. 119, Issue 2, pp. 346-374, 2017. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2939973 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12175

Matias Nuñez (Contact Author)

Université Paris Dauphine ( email )

Place du Maréchal de Tassigny
Paris, Cedex 16 75775
France

Dimitrios Xefteris

University of Cyprus ( email )

75 Kallipoleos Street
P.O. Box 20537
1678 Nicosia
Cyprus

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