The Law and Economics of Concealing Health and Safety Information

40 Pages Posted: 25 Mar 2017

See all articles by Daniel Ingberman

Daniel Ingberman

Washington University in Saint Louis - John M. Olin Business School

Asrat Tesfayesus

United States Patent and Trademark Office

Date Written: January 2017

Abstract

A conspiracy to conceal information is a central allegation in prominent mass tort claims totaling billions of dollars. Analysis of such claims can be informed by evaluating firms' economic incentives to conceal substantive information. We show that these incentives — and thus the potential merit of such allegations — relies on the dynamic nature of the "markets" for information and innovation, which determine current and future expected public information dissemination and determine the likelihood of successful concealment of information.

Keywords: Information Concealment, Conspiracy, Mass Tort, Dynamic Markets, Innovation

JEL Classification: D43, K13, K21, K32

Suggested Citation

Ingberman, Daniel and Tesfayesus, Asrat, The Law and Economics of Concealing Health and Safety Information (January 2017). Forthcoming Journal of Law, Economics & Policy 2017, USPTO Economic Working Paper 2016-05, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2940450 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2940450

Daniel Ingberman

Washington University in Saint Louis - John M. Olin Business School ( email )

One Brookings Drive
Campus Box 1133
St. Louis, MO 63130-4899
United States

Asrat Tesfayesus (Contact Author)

United States Patent and Trademark Office ( email )

Alexandria
VA 22313-1451
United States

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
59
Abstract Views
778
rank
415,486
PlumX Metrics