Noisy Persuasion

28 Pages Posted: 27 Mar 2017 Last revised: 2 Aug 2018

See all articles by Elias Tsakas

Elias Tsakas

Maastricht University - Department of Economics

Nikolas Tsakas

University of Cyprus - Department of Economics

Date Written: July 25, 2018

Abstract

We study the effect of noise due to exogenous information distortions in the context of Bayesian persuasion. In particular, we ask whether more noise is always harmful for the information designer (viz., the sender). We show that in general this is not the case. That is, more noise is often beneficial for the sender. However, when we compare noisy channels with "similar basic structures", more noise cannot be beneficial for the sender. We apply our theory to applications from the literatures on voting and cognitive biases.

Keywords: Bayesian Persuasion; Data Distortions; Optimal Signal; Garbling.

JEL Classification: C72, D72, D82, D83, K40, M31

Suggested Citation

Tsakas, Elias and Tsakas, Nikolas, Noisy Persuasion (July 25, 2018). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2940681 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2940681

Elias Tsakas

Maastricht University - Department of Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 616
Maastricht, 6200 MD
Netherlands

Nikolas Tsakas (Contact Author)

University of Cyprus - Department of Economics ( email )

75 Kallipoleos Street
P.O. Box 20537
1678 Nicosia
Cyprus

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