Electoral Externalities in Federations - Evidence from German Opinion Polls

28 Pages Posted: 27 Mar 2017

See all articles by Xenia Frei

Xenia Frei

ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research

Sebastian Langer

Leibniz Institute of Ecological and Regional Development (IOER)

Robert Lehmann

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute) - Ifo Institute

Felix Roesel

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Date Written: March 06, 2017

Abstract

Party performance in state and federal elections is highly interdependent. Federal elections impact regional voting dynamics and vice versa (electoral externalities). We quantify the extent of simultaneous electoral externalities between two layers of government. We apply vector autoregressions with predetermined variables to unique opinion poll data for the German state of Berlin and the federal level in Germany. State voting intentions for the state and for the federal parliament are the endogenous variables; the federal election trend is treated as predetermined. Our results suggest that shocks in federal parliament voting intention impact state parliament voting intention, but – as a new finding – to the same extent also vice versa. Externalities account for around 10% to 30% of variation at the other level of government. The effects differ across parties. Electoral externalities are less pronounced for the conservative party, but increase in times of government. The opposite holds true for left-wing parties.

Keywords: elections, opinion polls, time series, party vote shares, federalism

JEL Classification: D720, H770, C320

Suggested Citation

Frei, Xenia and Langer, Sebastian and Lehmann, Robert and Roesel, Felix, Electoral Externalities in Federations - Evidence from German Opinion Polls (March 06, 2017). CESifo Working Paper Series No. 6375. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2941433

Xenia Frei

ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research ( email )

Dresden Branch
Einsteinstraße 3
Dresden, 01069
Germany

Sebastian Langer

Leibniz Institute of Ecological and Regional Development (IOER) ( email )

Weberplatz 1
Dresden, 01217
Germany

Robert Lehmann (Contact Author)

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute) - Ifo Institute ( email )

Einsteinstrasse 3
Dresden, 01069
Germany
+49(0)351 / 26476-21 (Phone)
+49(0)351 / 26476-20 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.cesifo-group.de/ifoHome/CESifo-Group/ifoDresden/ifo-ND-Mitarbeiter/cvifod-lehmann_r.html

Felix Roesel

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute) ( email )

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

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