Tax Compliance and Information Provision - A Field Experiment with Small Firms

Journal of Behavioral Economics for Policy, Vol. 1, No. 1, 47-54

8 Pages Posted: 3 Apr 2017

See all articles by Philipp Dörrenberg

Philipp Dörrenberg

University of Mannheim; IZA Institute of Labor Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute); ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research

Jan Schmitz

Radboud University Nijmegen - Department of Economics

Multiple version iconThere are 3 versions of this paper

Date Written: 2017

Abstract

We report the results of a field experiment on tax compliance with small firms in Slovenia. Firms in the first treatment group received a letter that highlighted the importance of paying taxes and the likelihood of becoming subject to an audit. In the second treatment group, tax officers from the tax authorities handed out in person the same letter that companies in the first treatment group received by post. The results tentatively indicate that (i) such letters sent by post can increase compliance (relative to an untreated control group) and (ii) the personal delivery of the letter has a positive compliance effect (relative to the same letter sent by post).

Keywords: tax compliance, audits, randomized field experiment, tax authority, information provision

JEL Classification: : H20, H32, H50, C93

Suggested Citation

Dörrenberg, Philipp and Schmitz, Jan, Tax Compliance and Information Provision - A Field Experiment with Small Firms (2017). Journal of Behavioral Economics for Policy, Vol. 1, No. 1, 47-54, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2941474

Philipp Dörrenberg

University of Mannheim ( email )

L 7, 3-5
Mannheim, 68161
Germany

IZA Institute of Labor Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute) ( email )

Munich
Germany

ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research ( email )

P.O. Box 10 34 43
L 7,1
D-68034 Mannheim, 68034
Germany

Jan Schmitz (Contact Author)

Radboud University Nijmegen - Department of Economics ( email )

Nijmegen, 6500 HK
Netherlands

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