Fintech, Regulatory Arbitrage, and the Rise of Shadow Banks

83 Pages Posted: 29 Mar 2017 Last revised: 30 Aug 2018

See all articles by Greg Buchak

Greg Buchak

Stanford University Graduate School of Business

Gregor Matvos

Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management

Tomasz Piskorski

Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Finance

Amit Seru

Stanford University

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: May 1, 2017

Abstract

Shadow bank market share in residential mortgage origination nearly doubled from 2007-2015, with particularly dramatic growth among online “fintech” lenders. We study how two forces, regulatory differences and technological advantages, contributed to this growth. Difference in difference tests exploiting geographical heterogeneity induced by four specific increases in regulatory burden –capital requirements, mortgage servicing rights, mortgage-related lawsuits, and the movement of supervision to Office of Comptroller and Currency following closure of the Office of Thrift Supervision -- all reveal that traditional banks contracted in markets where they faced more regulatory constraints; shadow banks partially filled these gaps. Fintech lenders appear to offer a higher quality product and charge a premium of 14-16 basis points. Relative to other lenders, they seem to use different information to set interest rates. A quantitative model of mortgage lending suggests that regulation accounts for roughly 60% of shadow bank growth, while technology accounts for roughly 30%.

Keywords: Fintech, Shadow Banks, Regulatory Arbitrage, Lending, Mortgages, FHA

JEL Classification: G2, L5

Suggested Citation

Buchak, Greg and Matvos, Gregor and Piskorski, Tomasz and Seru, Amit, Fintech, Regulatory Arbitrage, and the Rise of Shadow Banks (May 1, 2017). Columbia Business School Research Paper No. 17-39, Journal of Financial Economics (JFE), Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2941561 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2941561

Greg Buchak

Stanford University Graduate School of Business ( email )

655 Knight Way
Stanford, CA 94305-5015
United States
6507214004 (Phone)
94305 (Fax)

Gregor Matvos

Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management ( email )

2001 Sheridan Road
Evanston, IL 60208
United States

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/site/gmatvos/

Tomasz Piskorski

Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Finance ( email )

3022 Broadway
New York, NY 10027
United States

Amit Seru (Contact Author)

Stanford University ( email )

Stanford, CA 94305
United States

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
3,035
Abstract Views
12,727
Rank
6,166
PlumX Metrics