Full Disclosure: A Round-Up of FCA Experimental Research into Giving Information

65 Pages Posted: 9 Mar 2017

See all articles by Laura Smart

Laura Smart

Financial Conduct Authority

Date Written: November 30, 2016


The FCA has been at the forefront of the use of behavioural science and experiments to inform regulation. Since our first field trial on customer compensation in 2013, we have published the results of experimental research in a number of consumer markets, including savings accounts, structured savings products, and car and home insurance. This round-up paper presents eight further experiments, comprising five field trials and three online experiments, which test the effect of interventions that draw on behavioural theory, such as increasing salience or personalisation.

We investigate diverse questions including: How can we design disclosure about annuities to help people get a better deal? How can firms improve customers’ engagement with their mortgages? What messages encourage customers to claim compensation? We also apply behavioural insights in a novel setting; improving compliance and engagement amongst regulated firms using communications.

While some experiments corroborate existing research or find interesting effects, others did not find any statistically significant effects. We are publishing these results, including non-significant and negative results, in the spirit of good research: improving evidence, combatting publication bias and making our research transparent. We also share some of the practical lessons we have learned, in the hope that others may benefit from them.

Suggested Citation

Smart, Laura, Full Disclosure: A Round-Up of FCA Experimental Research into Giving Information (November 30, 2016). FCA Occasional Paper No. 23. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2943408

Laura Smart (Contact Author)

Financial Conduct Authority ( email )

25 The North Colonnade
Canary Wharf
London, E14 5HS
United Kingdom

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