Barriers to Resolution in Ideologically Based Negotiations: The Role of Values and Institutions

Academy of Management Review, 27 (1): 41-57 Date: March 1, 2001

Ross School of Business Paper No. 1357

40 Pages Posted: 31 Mar 2017

See all articles by Kimberly A. Wade-Benzoni

Kimberly A. Wade-Benzoni

Duke University - Fuqua School of Business

Andrew John Hoffman

University of Michigan, Stephen M. Ross School of Business

Leigh Thompson

Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management

Don A. Moore

University of California, Berkeley - Haas School of Business

James Gillespie

Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management

Max H. Bazerman

Harvard Business School - Negotiations, Organizations and Markets Unit

Date Written: March 1, 2001

Abstract

While traditional behavioral decision theory as applied to negotiation sheds light on some of the barriers encountered in negotiations, it does not fully account for many of the difficulties and failures to reach settlement in ideologically-based disputes. In this paper, we identify a number of factors that differentiate ideologically-based negotiations from other types of negotiation, and advance a perspective that takes into account the value-laden and institutional contexts in which they occur. We illustrate our ideas by applying them to the organizationally relevant example of environmental disputes.

Keywords: Negotiations, Dispute resolution, Ideologically based disputes, values

Suggested Citation

Wade-Benzoni, Kimberly A. and Hoffman, Andrew John and Thompson, Leigh and Moore, Don A. and Gillespie, James and Bazerman, Max H., Barriers to Resolution in Ideologically Based Negotiations: The Role of Values and Institutions (March 1, 2001). Academy of Management Review, 27 (1): 41-57 Date: March 1, 2001, Ross School of Business Paper No. 1357, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2944066 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2944066

Kimberly A. Wade-Benzoni (Contact Author)

Duke University - Fuqua School of Business ( email )

Box 90120
Durham, NC 27708-0120
United States

Andrew John Hoffman

University of Michigan, Stephen M. Ross School of Business ( email )

701 Tappan Street, R4390
Ann Arbor, MI MI 48109
United States
734.763.9455 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.andrewhoffman.net/

Leigh Thompson

Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management ( email )

2001 Sheridan Road
Donald P. Jacobs Center
Evanston, IL 60208
United States
847-467-3505 (Phone)
847-491-8896 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.LeighThompson.com

Don A. Moore

University of California, Berkeley - Haas School of Business ( email )

545 Student Services Building, #1900
2220 Piedmont Avenue
Berkeley, CA 94720
United States

James Gillespie

Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management ( email )

2001 Sheridan Road
Evanston, IL 60208
United States

Max H. Bazerman

Harvard Business School - Negotiations, Organizations and Markets Unit ( email )

Soldiers Field
Boston, MA 02163
United States
617-495-6429 (Phone)
617-496-4191 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.people.hbs.edu/mbazerman

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