Multi-Unit Assignment under Dichotomous Preferences

28 Pages Posted: 3 Apr 2017 Last revised: 20 Jul 2018

See all articles by Josue Ortega

Josue Ortega

Center for European Economic Research

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: July 6, 2018

Abstract

I study the problem of allocating objects among agents without using money. Agents can receive several objects and have dichotomous preferences, meaning that they either consider objects to be acceptable or not. In this setup, the egalitarian solution is more appealing than the competitive equilibrium with equal incomes because it is Lorenz dominant, unique in utilities, and group strategy-proof. Moreover, it can be adapted to satisfy a new fairness axiom that arises naturally in this context. Both solutions are disjoint.

Keywords: multi-unit random assignment, endogenous quotas, egalitarian solution, dichotomous preferences, Lorenz dominance, competitive equilibrium with equal incomes

JEL Classification: D63, C78

Suggested Citation

Ortega, Josue, Multi-Unit Assignment under Dichotomous Preferences (July 6, 2018). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2944096 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2944096

Josue Ortega (Contact Author)

Center for European Economic Research ( email )

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Mannheim, 68161
Germany

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