How the Sharing Economy Is Transforming 'Corporate Governance'

Lex Research Topics in Corporate Law & Economics Working Paper No. 2017-2

12 Pages Posted: 1 May 2017

See all articles by Mark Fenwick

Mark Fenwick

Kyushu University - Graduate School of Law

Erik P. M. Vermeulen

Tilburg University - Department of Business Law; Signify (formerly known as Philips Lighting) - Legal Department; Tilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); Kyushu University - Graduate School of Law

Date Written: April 3, 2017

Abstract

Snap’s IPO with no voting rights shows there is disagreement on what good governance means. Some experts viewed the founders’ total control over Snap, and the resulting lack of accountability to shareholders, as a “banana republic approach” to corporate governance. Others believe that Snap’s IPO shifts the balance from shareholders to stakeholders. But perhaps this is the wrong discussion. In an age of disruptive technology, the sharing economy and a millennial culture, the traditional perspective needs to change. A new “corporate governance” needs to be designed around this new reality.

Keywords: Artificial Intelligence, Big Data, Communication, Corporate Governance, Dual Class Shares, Ecosystem, Innovation, Ipo, Non-Voting Stock, Platforms, Sharing Economy, Technology, Trust

JEL Classification: D83, G34, L23, L25, L26, K22, O16

Suggested Citation

Fenwick, Mark and Vermeulen, Erik P.M., How the Sharing Economy Is Transforming 'Corporate Governance' (April 3, 2017). Lex Research Topics in Corporate Law & Economics Working Paper No. 2017-2, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2945294 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2945294

Mark Fenwick

Kyushu University - Graduate School of Law ( email )

744 Motooka, Nishi-ku,
Fukuoka, Fukuoka 819-0395
Japan

Erik P.M. Vermeulen (Contact Author)

Tilburg University - Department of Business Law ( email )

Signify (formerly known as Philips Lighting) - Legal Department ( email )

Amstelplein 2
Amsterdam
Netherlands

Tilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC)

Warandelaan 2
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

Kyushu University - Graduate School of Law ( email )

6-19-1, Hakozaki, Higashiku
Fukuoka, 812-8581
Japan

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