Banks, Maturity Mismatches and Liquidity Crises: A Simple Model
CIES Working Paper No. 132
14 Pages Posted: 21 Dec 2001
Date Written: July 2001
Abstract
In determining the maturity structure of bank loans in the presence of pre-determined, short-term international liabilities, we show that maturity mismatches in banks' balance sheets are fully consistent with the assumption of banks acting as self-interested, optimising agents. Although often attributed to the moral hazard associated with safety nets, the analysis shows that financial crises can occur in their absence.
Keywords: banks, currency crisis, East Asia, maturity mismatches, moral hazard
JEL Classification: F34, F39, G21
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Rajan, Ramkishen S., Banks, Maturity Mismatches and Liquidity Crises: A Simple Model (July 2001). CIES Working Paper No. 132, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=294584 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.294584
Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?
Feedback
Feedback to SSRN
If you need immediate assistance, call 877-SSRNHelp (877 777 6435) in the United States, or +1 212 448 2500 outside of the United States, 8:30AM to 6:00PM U.S. Eastern, Monday - Friday.