북한 주변국의 대북제재와 무역대체 효과 (Neighboring Countries’ Sanctions Against North Korea and Changes in Trade)

160 Pages Posted: 21 Apr 2017

See all articles by Jangho Choi

Jangho Choi

Korea Institute for International Economic Policy

Sooho Lim

Korea Institute for International Economic Policy

Jung-kyun Rhee

Korea Institute for International Economic Policy

So Jeong Im

Korea Institute for International Economic Policy

Date Written: December 30, 2016

Abstract

Korean Abstract: 이 연구는 지금까지 이루어진 대북제재의 역사와 내용, 쟁점을 살펴보고 대북제재가 북한과 그 주변국의 무역 구도를 어떻게 바꾸어 놓았는지 분석하는 것을 목적으로 한다. 이를 바탕으로 북한의 핵개발을 효과적으로 저지하기 위한 한국정부의 정책방안을 제시하였다. 이 연구의 새로운 기여는 첫째, 대북제재가 북한무역에 미친 영향을 중단ㆍ대체ㆍ우회ㆍ창조로 구분하고 이를 실증 분석했다는 점, 둘째, 이를 통해 대북제재 이후 북한의 대중 무역 의존도 증가는 북ㆍ중 양국 무역 증가로만 설명할 수 없으며, 북한-중국-제3국의 우회무역도 포함하고 있다는 점, 셋째, 본 연구에서 정립한 개념들을 현지조사를 통해 재확인함으로써 연구의 정합성을 높였다는 점이다. 한반도 비핵화는 남북관계뿐 아니라 동북아 지역의 평화로운 공존을 위해서 반드시 달성해야 하는 과제이다. 이 연구가 디딤돌이 되어 대북정책 수립에 유용하게 활용될 수 있기를 기대한다.

English Abstract: The international community's sanctions are getting tighter due to North Korea's continued nuclear missile tests in January and September 2016. This report aims to examine the impact of sanctions against North Korea on its neighboring countries' trade. First, in the 2nd chapter we analyzed the history, main contents, and issues of multilateral and bilateral sanctions against North Korea. In the 3rd chapter we categorized North Korea’s trade into termination, substitution, detour, creation, and provided empirical analysis using trade dataIt is necessary to clarify the concept of detour trade among the concepts of termination, substitution, detour, and creation in trade as a result of sanctions. In general, detour trade(sanction target country-3rd country-sanction sender country) is a trade that makes a detour via a 3rd country in order to avoid sanctions by the sanction sender country, which is based on illegality. However, detour trade concept used in this research is similar to the usual usage of the term in that it maintains the trade route using a detour, but is different in that it does not necessarily need to be illegal. In this research detour trade encompasses both legal and illegal trade. Legal detour trade is trade that abides by the customary rules of origin. For example, if an item that is traded on a detour from North Korea to a 3rd country via China is 60% produced by China and 40% by North Korea, then its origin is legally China. Therefore in this case even if the item had been in part manufactured in North Korea, it will not be subject to sanctions.

In the 4th chapter we surveyed the history of cross-border business in the North Korea-China border region and how the how the main actors and locations(Dandong and Yanbian) of the cross-border business changed after the sanctions, and how export items changed through trade statistics analysis. Finally in the 5th chapter we analyzed the future scenario, issues and implications of sanctions against North Korea.

Note: Downloadable document is in Korean.

Suggested Citation

Choi, Jangho and Lim, Sooho and Rhee, Jung-kyun and Im, So Jeong, 북한 주변국의 대북제재와 무역대체 효과 (Neighboring Countries’ Sanctions Against North Korea and Changes in Trade) (December 30, 2016). KIEP Research Paper, Policy Analyses 16-08 . Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2945982 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2945982

Jangho Choi (Contact Author)

Korea Institute for International Economic Policy ( email )

[30147] Building C, Sejong National Research Compl
Seoul, 370
Korea, Republic of (South Korea)

Sooho Lim

Korea Institute for International Economic Policy ( email )

[30147] Building C, Sejong National Research Compl
Seoul, 370
Korea, Republic of (South Korea)

Jung-kyun Rhee

Korea Institute for International Economic Policy ( email )

[30147] Building C, Sejong National Research Compl
Seoul, 370
Korea, Republic of (South Korea)

So Jeong Im

Korea Institute for International Economic Policy ( email )

[30147] Building C, Sejong National Research Compl
Seoul, 370
Korea, Republic of (South Korea)

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