Political Competition with Campaign Contributions and Informative Advertising

52 Pages Posted: 20 Dec 2001 Last revised: 1 Feb 2002

See all articles by Stephen Coate

Stephen Coate

Cornell University - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Date Written: December 2001

Abstract

This paper presents a model of political competition with campaign contributions and informative political advertising. Policy-motivated parties compete by selecting candidates and interest groups provide contributions to enhance the electoral prospects of like-minded candidates. Contributions are used to finance advertising campaigns that provide voters with information about candidates' ideologies. The model embodies rational behavior on the part of all actors, is analytically tractable, and has a unique equilibrium. The paper uses the model to analyze the welfare economics of contribution limits. Such limits are shown to redistribute welfare from moderate voters to interest group members. They may or may not raise aggregate welfare.

Suggested Citation

Coate, Stephen, Political Competition with Campaign Contributions and Informative Advertising (December 2001). NBER Working Paper No. w8693, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=294742

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