Procedural Decision-Making and the Banking Union: The Accountability Mechanisms

TARN Working Paper Series 4/2017, April 2017

19 Pages Posted: 11 Apr 2017  

Marco Macchia

University of Rome, Tor Vergata

Date Written: April 8, 2017

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to examine the accountability mechanisms for Banking Union institutions. Leaving rule making tasks in the background, the goal of this paper is to examine closely the adjudication activity of Banking Union authorities, and to shed light on the problems stemming from the growing political dimension of decisions taken by agencies, which are characterised by technical content. The paper aims at demonstrating that existing accountability instruments, which relate to the exercise of power on the part of the Single Supervisory Board and the Single Resolution Board as for supervision and resolution, can be suitable for the financial market and that they provide a good level of protection of credit institutions’ interests. While enhancing accountability, these instruments also encourage and strengthen the legitimacy of the authorities that are under examination.

Keywords: Accountability, agencies, horizontal accountability, independence, judicial review, parliamentary control

Suggested Citation

Macchia, Marco, Procedural Decision-Making and the Banking Union: The Accountability Mechanisms (April 8, 2017). TARN Working Paper Series 4/2017, April 2017. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2948873

Marco Macchia (Contact Author)

University of Rome, Tor Vergata ( email )

Via di Tor Vergata
Rome, Lazio 00133
Italy

Paper statistics

Downloads
30
Abstract Views
113