Common-Value Procurement Auctions with Renegotiation

Theoretical Economics Letters, Vol. 4, p. 619-622, 2014 doi: 10.4236/tel.2014.48078

5 Pages Posted: 11 Apr 2017

See all articles by Rimvydas Baltaduonis

Rimvydas Baltaduonis

Gettysburg College - Department of Economics

Lucas Rentschler

Utah State University - Department of Economics and Finance

Date Written: August 18, 2014

Abstract

This note contains the equilibrium bid functions for two types of common-value procurement auctions: 1) a procurement auction in which bids represent an enforceable contract; 2) a procurement auction in which, upon learning the true cost of supplying the good, the winning bidder can renegotiate the contract with the buyer, and each bidder must submit a bond with their bid, which is returned at the end of the auction unless they are the low bidder and renegotiate the contract.

Keywords: Procurement Auctions, Renegotiation, Bidding, Equilibrium

JEL Classification: D44

Suggested Citation

Baltaduonis, Rimvydas and Rentschler, Lucas, Common-Value Procurement Auctions with Renegotiation (August 18, 2014). Theoretical Economics Letters, Vol. 4, p. 619-622, 2014 doi: 10.4236/tel.2014.48078, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2949009

Rimvydas Baltaduonis (Contact Author)

Gettysburg College - Department of Economics ( email )

300 N Washington St
Campus Box 391
Gettysburg, PA 17325
United States

Lucas Rentschler

Utah State University - Department of Economics and Finance ( email )

Logan, UT 84322-1400
United States

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
35
Abstract Views
262
PlumX Metrics