Gaps and Triangles

24 Pages Posted: 27 Dec 2001

See all articles by Bernardino Adão

Bernardino Adão

Banco de Portugal

Isabel H. Correia

Bank of Portugal - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Pedro Teles

Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: December 2001

Abstract

In this paper, we derive principles of optimal cyclical monetary policy in an economy without capital, with a cash-in-advance restriction on household transactions, and with monopolistic firms that set prices one period in advance. The only distortionary policy instruments are the nominal interest rate and the money supply. In this environment, it is feasible to undo both the cash in advance and the price setting restrictions, but not the monopolistic competition distortion. We show that it is optimal to follow the Friedman rule, and thus offset the cash-in-advance restriction. We also find that, in general, it is not optimal to undo the price setting restriction. Sticky prices provide the planner with tools to improve upon a distorted flexible prices allocation.

Keywords: optimal cyclical monetary policy, Friedman rule, prices set in advance

JEL Classification: E31, E41, E58, E62

Suggested Citation

Adão, Bernardino Manuel and Horta Correia, Isabel and Teles, Pedro, Gaps and Triangles (December 2001). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=294939 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.294939

Bernardino Manuel Adão

Banco de Portugal ( email )

Research Department
1150 Lisbon
Portugal
(351 21) 312 8409 (Phone)
(351 21) 815 3623 (Fax)

Isabel Horta Correia

Bank of Portugal - Department of Economics ( email )

Av Almirante Reis, 71
P-1150-012 Lisboa
Portugal
+351 21 312 8397 (Phone)
+351 21 813 2221 (Fax)

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

Pedro Teles (Contact Author)

Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago ( email )

230 South LaSalle Street
Chicago, IL 60604
United States
312-322-2947 (Phone)
312-322-2357 (Fax)

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom