Sequential Lottery Contests with Multiple Participants

24 Pages Posted: 10 Apr 2017

See all articles by Nava Kahana

Nava Kahana

Bar-Ilan University - Department of Economics; IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Doron Klunover

Bar-Ilan University

Date Written: April 10, 2017

Abstract

The literature on aggregative games, which has been applied in the study of contests, has focused on simultaneous games. We apply aggregative games techniques in a novel fashion in the analysis of sequential lottery contests with n players. It is shown that: (1) there exists a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in pure strategies, and (2) unlike in the case of a small contest, aggregate expenditure in a large contest is lower than in the corresponding simultaneous contest.

Keywords: Aggregative games, Sequential Contests, Subgame Perfect Equilibrium

JEL Classification: C72, D43, L13

Suggested Citation

Kahana, Nava and Klunover, Doron, Sequential Lottery Contests with Multiple Participants (April 10, 2017). Working Paper of the Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance No. 2017-02. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2949725

Nava Kahana

Bar-Ilan University - Department of Economics ( email )

Ramat-Gan, 52900
Israel

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Schaumburg-Lippe-Str. 7 / 9
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Doron Klunover (Contact Author)

Bar-Ilan University ( email )

Ramat Gan
Ramat Gan, 52900
Israel

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