Marriage Market, Divorce Legislation, and Household Labor Supply

Posted: 24 Jan 2002

See all articles by Pierre-Andre Chiappori

Pierre-Andre Chiappori

Columbia University - Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, Department of Economics

Bernard Fortin

Université Laval - Département d'Économique; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Guy Lacroix

Université Laval - Département d'Économique; IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Abstract

This paper provides a theoretical framework for analyzing the impact of the marriage market and divorce legislation on household labor supply. In our approach, the sex ratio in the marriage market and the rules governing divorce are examples of "distribution factors." These factors are defined as variables that affect the household members' bargaining position but not preferences or the joint budget set. We extend the collective labor supply model developed by Chiappori to allow for distribution factors. We show that our model imposes new restrictions on the labor supply functions and eases the identification of individual preferences and the intrahousehold decision process. The model is estimated using PSID data for the year 1988. Our results do not reject the restrictions imposed by the model. Also, the sex ratio and divorce laws deemed favorable to women are found to affect labor supply behavior and the decision process in the directions predicted by the theory and to have sizable effects.

Suggested Citation

Chiappori, Pierre-Andre and Fortin, Bernard and Lacroix, Guy, Marriage Market, Divorce Legislation, and Household Labor Supply. Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 110, February 2002, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=295064

Pierre-Andre Chiappori (Contact Author)

Columbia University - Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, Department of Economics ( email )

420 W. 118th Street
New York, NY 10027
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Bernard Fortin

Université Laval - Département d'Économique ( email )

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National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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IZA Institute of Labor Economics

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Germany

Guy Lacroix

Université Laval - Département d'Économique ( email )

2325 Rue de l'Université
Ste-Foy, Quebec G1K 7P4 G1K 7P4
Canada
418-656-2024 (Phone)
418-656-7798 (Fax)

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

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