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Fiduciary Duties in Social Enterprise

Forthcoming in: J. Yockey & B. Means, eds., The Cambridge Handbook of Social Enterprise Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press)

24 Pages Posted: 17 Apr 2017  

Andrew S. Gold

DePaul University College of Law

Paul B. Miller

Notre Dame Law School

Date Written: April 11, 2017

Abstract

This chapter examines theoretical and practical issues relating to fiduciary administration in social enterprise. It argues that social enterprise often calls for fiduciary administration on a hybrid model, combining elements of service-type administration and governance-type administration. Like standard service-type situations, social enterprise calls for administration in the interests of a defined constituency (ordinarily, shareholders). However, hybridity is introduced through the commitment to general public-oriented purposes that distinguish social enterprise from conventional business organizations. We will show that, contrary to common opinion, the fiduciary hybridity found in social enterprise is neither unique nor unworkable. We will briefly discuss other examples of hybrid fiduciary relationships and institutions, and we will explain the value of hybridity and how problems attributed to it are, or may be, resolved.

Keywords: social enterprise, fiduciary duties, discretion, for-profit, non-profit, corporate governance, public benefit corporations

JEL Classification: G30

Suggested Citation

Gold, Andrew S. and Miller, Paul B., Fiduciary Duties in Social Enterprise (April 11, 2017). Forthcoming in: J. Yockey & B. Means, eds., The Cambridge Handbook of Social Enterprise Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2951401

Andrew S. Gold (Contact Author)

DePaul University College of Law ( email )

25 E. Jackson Blvd.
Chicago, IL Cook County 60604-2287
United States
312-362-5927 (Phone)

Paul B. Miller

Notre Dame Law School ( email )

Eck Hall of Law
Notre Dame, IN 46556
United States

HOME PAGE: http://law.nd.edu/directory/paul-miller/

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