Sequential Persuasion

35 Pages Posted: 16 Apr 2017 Last revised: 18 May 2017

Fei Li

University of North Carolina (UNC) at Chapel Hill

Peter Norman

University of North Carolina (UNC) at Chapel Hill

Date Written: May 12, 2017

Abstract

This paper considers a general class of multi-sender Bayesian persuasion games in which senders move sequentially. All senders have reduced form utility functions over beliefs that are discontinuous at points of indifference for the decision maker, but we can still prove existence of equilibria by showing that it is without loss of generality to consider equilibria over a finite set of beliefs. We also show that for a set of sender payoff functions with Lebesgue measure one the equilibrium is essentially unique in terms of the joint distribution over outcomes and states. Finally, we establish some comparative statics. Adding a sender who makes the first move cannot reduce the informativeness of the equilibrium. Also, sequential persuasion generates less informative equilibria than simultaneous persuasion.

Keywords: Communication, Bayesian Persuasion, Multiple Senders, Sequential Persuasion

JEL Classification: D82, D83

Suggested Citation

Li, Fei and Norman, Peter, Sequential Persuasion (May 12, 2017). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2952606 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2952606

Fei Li (Contact Author)

University of North Carolina (UNC) at Chapel Hill ( email )

102 Ridge Road
Chapel Hill, NC NC 27514
United States

Peter Norman

University of North Carolina (UNC) at Chapel Hill ( email )

102 Ridge Road
Chapel Hill, NC NC 27514
United States

Paper statistics

Downloads
100
Rank
220,205
Abstract Views
403