35 Pages Posted: 16 Apr 2017 Last revised: 18 May 2017
Date Written: May 12, 2017
This paper considers a general class of multi-sender Bayesian persuasion games in which senders move sequentially. All senders have reduced form utility functions over beliefs that are discontinuous at points of indifference for the decision maker, but we can still prove existence of equilibria by showing that it is without loss of generality to consider equilibria over a finite set of beliefs. We also show that for a set of sender payoff functions with Lebesgue measure one the equilibrium is essentially unique in terms of the joint distribution over outcomes and states. Finally, we establish some comparative statics. Adding a sender who makes the first move cannot reduce the informativeness of the equilibrium. Also, sequential persuasion generates less informative equilibria than simultaneous persuasion.
Keywords: Communication, Bayesian Persuasion, Multiple Senders, Sequential Persuasion
JEL Classification: D82, D83
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation