52 Pages Posted: 16 Apr 2017 Last revised: 15 Jun 2018
Date Written: March 2, 2018
This paper studies sequential move persuasion games with multiple senders. We transform a problem with infinite action spaces to a finite action model. This way we prove the existence of equilibria by backward induction algorithm show that equilibrium outcomes are generically unique, and obtain a simple algorithm for finding equilibrium outcomes. We also obtain a simple condition for when full revelation is the unique equilibrium outcome and some comparative statics results. Adding a sender who moves first cannot reduce informativeness in equilibrium, and will result in a more informative equilibrium in the case with two states. Sequential persuasion cannot generate a more informative equilibrium than simultaneous persuasion and is always less informative when there are only two states.
Keywords: Communication, Bayesian Persuasion, Multiple Senders, Sequential Persuasion
JEL Classification: D82, D83
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation