Sequential Persuasion

52 Pages Posted: 16 Apr 2017 Last revised: 15 Jun 2018

Fei Li

University of North Carolina (UNC) at Chapel Hill

Peter Norman

University of North Carolina (UNC) at Chapel Hill

Date Written: March 2, 2018

Abstract

This paper studies sequential move persuasion games with multiple senders. We transform a problem with infinite action spaces to a finite action model. This way we prove the existence of equilibria by backward induction algorithm show that equilibrium outcomes are generically unique, and obtain a simple algorithm for finding equilibrium outcomes. We also obtain a simple condition for when full revelation is the unique equilibrium outcome and some comparative statics results. Adding a sender who moves first cannot reduce informativeness in equilibrium, and will result in a more informative equilibrium in the case with two states. Sequential persuasion cannot generate a more informative equilibrium than simultaneous persuasion and is always less informative when there are only two states.

Keywords: Communication, Bayesian Persuasion, Multiple Senders, Sequential Persuasion

JEL Classification: D82, D83

Suggested Citation

Li, Fei and Norman, Peter, Sequential Persuasion (March 2, 2018). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2952606 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2952606

Fei Li (Contact Author)

University of North Carolina (UNC) at Chapel Hill ( email )

102 Ridge Road
Chapel Hill, NC NC 27514
United States

Peter Norman

University of North Carolina (UNC) at Chapel Hill ( email )

102 Ridge Road
Chapel Hill, NC NC 27514
United States

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