Tailored Bayesian Mechanisms: Experimental Evidence from Two-Stage Voting Games

48 Pages Posted: 18 Apr 2017

See all articles by Dirk Engelmann

Dirk Engelmann

Humboldt University of Berlin - School of Business and Economics; Economics Institute of the Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic; University of Copenhagen; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Hans Grüner

University of Manheim; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

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Date Written: March 22, 2017

Abstract

Optimal voting rules have to be tailored to the underlying distribution of preferences. This paper shows that the introduction of a stage at which agents may themselves choose voting rules according to which they decide in a second stage may increase the sum of individuals’ payoffs if players are not all completely selfish. Our experiments aim to understand how privately informed individuals choose voting rules and vote given these rules. In a setting with an asymmetric distribution of valuations groups that can choose a voting rule do better than those who decide with a given simple majority voting rule.

Keywords: two-stage voting, Bayesian voting, experiments

JEL Classification: C910, D700, D820

Suggested Citation

Engelmann, Dirk and Grüner, Hans, Tailored Bayesian Mechanisms: Experimental Evidence from Two-Stage Voting Games (March 22, 2017). CESifo Working Paper Series No. 6405, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2954524 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2954524

Dirk Engelmann (Contact Author)

Humboldt University of Berlin - School of Business and Economics ( email )

Spandauer Str. 1
Berlin, D-10099
Germany

Economics Institute of the Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic ( email )

Prague
Czech Republic

University of Copenhagen ( email )

Nørregade 10
Copenhagen, København DK-1165
Denmark

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute) ( email )

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

Hans Grüner

University of Manheim

United States

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

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