The Impact of Cash Mobs in the Vote with the Wallet Game: Experimental Results

45 Pages Posted: 19 Apr 2017

See all articles by Leonardo Becchetti

Leonardo Becchetti

University of Rome Tor Vergata - Faculty of Economics

Maurizio Fiaschetti

University of Nottingham

Francesco Salustri

UCL Institute for Global Health

Date Written: October 19, 2016

Abstract

We simulate in a randomised lab experiment the effect of Cash Mobs on consumers’ behaviour in an original variant of the multiplayer Prisoner’s dilemma called Vote-with-the-wallet Game (VWG). The effect is modelled in a sequential game with/without an environmental frame in which a subset of players (cash-mobbers) is given the opportunity to reveal publicly (in aggregate without disclosing individual identities) their cooperation decision. We find that the treatment has a positive gross effect, that is, the share of cooperators is significantly higher in treated sessions and this is mainly due to the higher share of cooperators among cash-mobbers. Our results suggest that cash mobs-like mechanisms can help to solve social dilemmas with entirely private solutions (not based on punishment but on positive action) without costs for government budgets.

Keywords: Vote with the Wallet, Prisoner's Dilemma, Randomised Experiment

JEL Classification: C72, C73, C91, M14

Suggested Citation

Becchetti, Leonardo and Fiaschetti, Maurizio and Salustri, Francesco, The Impact of Cash Mobs in the Vote with the Wallet Game: Experimental Results (October 19, 2016). CEIS Working Paper No. 401, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2954612 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2954612

Leonardo Becchetti (Contact Author)

University of Rome Tor Vergata - Faculty of Economics ( email )

Via Columbia, 2
I-00133 Rome
Italy

Maurizio Fiaschetti

University of Nottingham ( email )

Business School North
Wollaton Road
Nottingham, NG81BB
United Kingdom
+44 (0) 115 8467420 (Phone)

Francesco Salustri

UCL Institute for Global Health ( email )

United Kingdom

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