Tax Havens and Disclosure Aggregation

Forthcoming, Journal of International Business Studies

44 Pages Posted: 24 Apr 2017

See all articles by Herita T. Akamah

Herita T. Akamah

University of Nebraska at Lincoln - School of Accountancy

Ole-Kristian Hope

University of Toronto - Rotman School of Management

Wayne B. Thomas

University of Oklahoma

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: April 24, 2017

Abstract

Multinational firms have been accused by politicians, regulators, and citizen groups of shifting profits to low-tax geographic areas. We present evidence that multinational firms with tax-haven operations tend to aggregate their geographic disclosures to a greater extent. The results are consistent with managers attempting to avoid criticism by reducing the transparency of their tax-avoidance activities. We find these results to be stronger for larger firms with higher political costs and for firms in natural-resources industries, in retail industries, or with low competition. The evidence is relevant to policy makers and others interested in multinational firms’ financial reporting and tax activities.

Keywords: Tax havens, aggregation, disclosure transparency, tax avoidance, geographic reporting, Exhibit 21

JEL Classification: H25, H26, F23, F30, M41, G30

Suggested Citation

Akamah, Herita T. and Hope, Ole-Kristian and Thomas, Wayne B., Tax Havens and Disclosure Aggregation (April 24, 2017). Forthcoming, Journal of International Business Studies. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2957589

Herita T. Akamah

University of Nebraska at Lincoln - School of Accountancy ( email )

307 College of Business Administration
Lincoln, NE 68588-0488
United States

Ole-Kristian Hope (Contact Author)

University of Toronto - Rotman School of Management ( email )

105 St. George Street
Toronto, Ontario M5S 3E6 M5S1S4
Canada

HOME PAGE: http://www.rotman.utoronto.ca/FacultyAndResearch/Faculty/FacultyBios/Hope.aspx

Wayne B. Thomas

University of Oklahoma ( email )

Michael F. Price College of Business,
307 W Brooks, Rm 212B
Norman, OK 73019
United States
405-325-5789 (Phone)
405-325-7348 (Fax)

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