Bank Ownership: Trends and Implications

50 Pages Posted: 25 Apr 2017

See all articles by Robert Cull

Robert Cull

World Bank - Development Research Group (DECRG)

Maria Soledad Martinez Peria

International Monetary Fund (IMF)

Jeanne Verrier

The Graduate Institute, Geneva

Date Written: March 2017

Abstract

This paper presents recent trends in bank ownership across countries and summarizes the evidence regarding the implications of bank ownership structure for bank performance and competition, financial stability, and access to finance. The evidence reviewed suggests that foreign-owned banks are more efficient than domestic banks in developing countries, promote competition in host banking sectors, and help stabilize credit when host countries face idiosyncratic shocks. But there are tradeoffs, since foreign-owned banks can transmit external shocks and might not always expand access to credit. The record on the impact of government bank ownership suggests few benefits, especially for developing countries.

Keywords: Foreign banks, Privatization, bank governance, financial globalization, state-owned banks, Financial Aspects of Economic Integration, Globalization: Finance, Government Policy and Regulation

JEL Classification: F23, F36, F65, G21, G28, G34

Suggested Citation

Cull, Robert and Martinez Peria, Maria Soledad and Verrier, Jeanne, Bank Ownership: Trends and Implications (March 2017). IMF Working Paper No. 17/60. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2958203

Robert Cull (Contact Author)

World Bank - Development Research Group (DECRG) ( email )

1818 H. Street, N.W.
MSN3-311
Washington, DC 20433
United States
202-473-6365 (Phone)
202-522-1155 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://econ.worldbank.org/staff/rcull

Maria Soledad Martinez Peria

International Monetary Fund (IMF) ( email )

700 19th Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20431
United States

Jeanne Verrier

The Graduate Institute, Geneva ( email )

Geneva
United States

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
117
Abstract Views
551
rank
234,429
PlumX Metrics