Do Private Water Utility Operators Care About Regulatory Agencies in Developing Countries?

21 Pages Posted: 27 Apr 2017

See all articles by Salvador Bertomeu Sanchez

Salvador Bertomeu Sanchez

Université Libre de Bruxelles (ULB) - European Center for Advanced Research in Economics and Statistics (ECARES)

Daniel Camos Daurella

World Bank

Antonio Estache

Université Libre de Bruxelles (ULB) - European Center for Advanced Research in Economics and Statistics (ECARES)

Date Written: April 26, 2017

Abstract

This paper shows that the creation of an independent regulatory agency is often not a necessary or sufficient condition to help attract private participation in the operation and financing of the water and sanitation sector in developing countries. However, the odds of an impact are significantly higher for Latin American and Caribbean countries and, to a lesser extent, Eastern European countries, than for any other region. Higher income levels and higher prices are also correlated with higher effectiveness of independent regulatory agencies in attracting private sector financing. Analysis of the impact on various types of public-private partnership contracts shows that, at the margin, independent regulatory agencies are irrelevant in general, for the contract choice, except for greenfield projects, for which such agencies may be counterproductive at the margin.

Keywords: Marketing, Non Governmental Organizations, Hydrology, Private Sector Economics, Economics and Institutions, Private Sector Development Law, Public Sector Management and Reform

Suggested Citation

Bertomeu Sanchez, Salvador and Camos Daurella, Daniel and Estache, Antonio, Do Private Water Utility Operators Care About Regulatory Agencies in Developing Countries? (April 26, 2017). World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 8045. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2959095

Salvador Bertomeu Sanchez (Contact Author)

Université Libre de Bruxelles (ULB) - European Center for Advanced Research in Economics and Statistics (ECARES)

Ave. Franklin D Roosevelt, 50 - C.P. 114
Brussels, B-1050
Belgium

Daniel Camos Daurella

World Bank ( email )

1818 H Street, NW
Washington, DC 20433
United States

Antonio Estache

Université Libre de Bruxelles (ULB) - European Center for Advanced Research in Economics and Statistics (ECARES) ( email )

Ave. Franklin D Roosevelt, 50 - C.P. 114
Brussels, B-1050
Belgium
32 (0)2 6503838 (Phone)

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