Formation of Coalition Structures as a Non-Cooperative Game

40 Pages Posted: 2 May 2017

See all articles by Dmitry Levando

Dmitry Levando

National Research University Higher School of Economics (Moscow)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: April 30, 2017


Traditionally social sciences are interested in structuring people in multiple groups based on their individual preferences. This paper suggests an approach to this problem in the framework of a noncooperative game theory.

Definition of a suggested finite game includes a family of nested simultaneous non-cooperative finite games with intra- and inter-coalition externalities. In this family, games differ by the size of maximum coalition, partitions and by coalition structure formation rules.

A result of every game consists of partition of players into coalitions and a payoff profile for every player. Every game in the family has an equilibrium in mixed strategies with possibly more than one coalition. The results of the game differ from those conventionally discussed in cooperative game theory, e.g. the Shapley value, strong Nash, coalition-proof equilibrium, core, kernel, nucleolus.

We discuss the following applications of the new game: cooperation as an allocation in one coalition, Bayesian games, stochastic games and construction of a non-cooperative criterion of coalition structure stability for studying focal points.

Keywords: Non-Cooperative Game, Nash Equilibrium, Cooperative Games, Focal Point

JEL Classification: C71, C72, C73

Suggested Citation

Levando, Dmitry, Formation of Coalition Structures as a Non-Cooperative Game (April 30, 2017). Available at SSRN: or

Dmitry Levando (Contact Author)

National Research University Higher School of Economics (Moscow) ( email )

Myasnitskaya street, 20
Moscow, Moscow 119017

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