When Do Leaders Free-Ride? Business Experience and Contributions to Collective Defense

40 Pages Posted: 2 May 2017  

Matthew Fuhrmann

Texas A&M University

Date Written: April 27, 2017

Abstract

The logic of free-riding expects that individuals will under-invest in public goods, but people often behave in ways that are inconsistent with this prediction. Why do we observe variation in free-riding behavior? This study addresses this question by examining contributions to an important international public good – collective defense in military alliances. It develops a behavioral theory of free-riding in which the beliefs of world leaders are important for explaining investments in public goods. The argument holds that leaders with business experience are more egoistic than non-business leaders, which results in smaller contributions to collective defense from former businesspersons. An analysis of defense expenditures in 17 members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) from 1952 to 2014 provides evidence consistent with the theory. The findings suggest that leaders with business experience are more likely than other heads of government to act as self-interested utility maximizers.

Keywords: Leaders, Free-Riding, International Conflict, Business Experience, Military Alliances, NATO, Public Goods, Collective Defense, Defense Spending, Proself, Prosocial

Suggested Citation

Fuhrmann, Matthew, When Do Leaders Free-Ride? Business Experience and Contributions to Collective Defense (April 27, 2017). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2960891 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2960891

Matthew Fuhrmann (Contact Author)

Texas A&M University ( email )

College Station, TX 77843
United States

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