Evolutionary Rent-Seeking

17 Pages Posted: 16 Jan 2002

See all articles by Burkhard Hehenkamp

Burkhard Hehenkamp

University of Paderborn

Wolfgang Leininger

University of Dortmund - Department of Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research)

Alex Possajennikov

University of Nottingham - School of Economics

Date Written: December 2001

Abstract

Tullock's analysis of rent-seeking is reconsidered from an evolutionary point of view. We show that evolutionarily stable behavior in a rent-seeking contest differs from efficient rent-seeking behavior in a Nash equilibrium. We explore the implications of evolutionary stability for rent-seeking behavior and relate them to the well examined Nash equilibrium behavior. A most interesting result is an overdissipation law, which holds in evolutionary equilibrium.

JEL Classification: C79, D72

Suggested Citation

Hehenkamp, Burkhard and Leininger, Wolfgang and Possajennikov, Alex, Evolutionary Rent-Seeking (December 2001). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=296117

Burkhard Hehenkamp

University of Paderborn ( email )

Warburger Str. 100
D-33098 Paderborn
United States

HOME PAGE: http://wiwi.uni-paderborn.de/dep4/lehrstuhl-prof-dr-hehenkamp/

Wolfgang Leininger (Contact Author)

University of Dortmund - Department of Economics ( email )

D-44221 Dortmund
Germany
+49 231 755 3297 (Phone)
+49 231 755 3027 (Fax)

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.CESifo.de

Alex Possajennikov

University of Nottingham - School of Economics ( email )

University Park
Nottingham, NG7 2RD
United Kingdom

HOME PAGE: http://www.nottingham.ac.uk/~lezap/

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