Evolutionary Rent-Seeking

Hehenkamp, Burkhard; Leininger, Wolfgang; Possajennikov, Alex

doi:10.2139/ssrn.296117

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Evolutionary Rent-Seeking

17 Pages Posted: 16 Jan 2002

See all articles by Burkhard Hehenkamp

Wolfgang Leininger

University of Dortmund - Department of Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research)

Alex Possajennikov

University of Nottingham - School of Economics

Date Written: December 2001

Abstract

Tullock's analysis of rent-seeking is reconsidered from an evolutionary point of view. We show that evolutionarily stable behavior in a rent-seeking contest differs from efficient rent-seeking behavior in a Nash equilibrium. We explore the implications of evolutionary stability for rent-seeking behavior and relate them to the well examined Nash equilibrium behavior. A most interesting result is an overdissipation law, which holds in evolutionary equilibrium.

JEL Classification: C79, D72

Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation

Hehenkamp, Burkhard and Leininger, Wolfgang and Possajennikov, Alex, Evolutionary Rent-Seeking (December 2001). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=296117 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.296117