Evolutionary Rent-Seeking
17 Pages Posted: 16 Jan 2002
Date Written: December 2001
Abstract
Tullock's analysis of rent-seeking is reconsidered from an evolutionary point of view. We show that evolutionarily stable behavior in a rent-seeking contest differs from efficient rent-seeking behavior in a Nash equilibrium. We explore the implications of evolutionary stability for rent-seeking behavior and relate them to the well examined Nash equilibrium behavior. A most interesting result is an overdissipation law, which holds in evolutionary equilibrium.
JEL Classification: C79, D72
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
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