Career Concerns in Teams

Posted: 21 Jan 2002

See all articles by Emmanuelle Auriol

Emmanuelle Auriol

University of Toulouse 1 - Toulouse School of Economics (TSE); University of Toulouse I - Advanced Research in Quantitative Applied Development Economics (ARQADE); CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Guido Friebel

Goethe University Frankfurt; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Lambros Pechlivanos

Athens University of Economics and Business - Department of International and European Economic Studies

Abstract

We study the impact of changes in the commitment power of a principal on cooperation among agents, in a model in which the principal and her agents are symmetrically uncertain about the agents' innate abilities. When the principal cannot commit herself to long-term wage contracts, two types of implicit incentives emerge. First, agents become concerned about their perceived personal productivity. Second, agents become more reluctant to behave cooperatively - they have an incentive to "sabotage" their colleagues. Anticipating this risk, and in order to induce the desired level of cooperation, the principal must offer more collectively oriented incentive schemes. We also show that temporary workers are not affected by the sabotage effect and that as a result, their incentives are more individually oriented.

Keywords: Teamwork, Career concerns, Sabotage, Commitment, Collective orientation of incentive schemes

JEL Classification: J33, D23, M12

Suggested Citation

Auriol, Emmanuelle and Friebel, Guido and Pechlivanos, Lambros, Career Concerns in Teams. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=296235

Emmanuelle Auriol

University of Toulouse 1 - Toulouse School of Economics (TSE) ( email )

Place Anatole-France
Toulouse Cedex, F-31042
France

University of Toulouse I - Advanced Research in Quantitative Applied Development Economics (ARQADE) ( email )

21 Allee de Brienne
Toulouse, 31000
France
+33 5 61 12 85 89 (Phone)
+33 5 61 12 86 37 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.idei.asso.fr/English/ECv/CvChercheurs/E

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

Guido Friebel (Contact Author)

Goethe University Frankfurt ( email )

Gr├╝neburgplatz 1
Frankfurt am Main, 60323
Germany

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Lambros Pechlivanos

Athens University of Economics and Business - Department of International and European Economic Studies ( email )

Patission 76
GR-10434 Athens
Greece
+30 210 8203728 (Phone)

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