Judicial Independence in the EU – A Puzzle

Gutmann, Jerg; Voigt, Stefan (2017): Judicial Independence in the EU – A Puzzle, ILE Working Paper Series, No. 4

23 Pages Posted: 4 May 2017

See all articles by Jerg Gutmann

Jerg Gutmann

University of Hamburg - Institute of Law and Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Stefan Voigt

University of Hamburg - Institute of Law & Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Date Written: May 4, 2017

Abstract

Based on data from the EU Justice Scoreboard, we identify a puzzle: National levels of judicial independence (as perceived by the citizens of EU member states) are negatively associated with the presence of formal legislation usually considered as conducive to judicial independence. We try to resolve this puzzle based on political economy explanations and specificities of legal systems, but to no avail. We then ask whether cultural traits can help to put together the puzzle. And indeed, countries with high levels of generalized trust (and to a lesser extent individualistic countries) exhibit increased levels of de facto judicial independence and, at the same time, reduced levels of de jure judicial independence. The combination of these two effects can explain why judicial reforms that should be conducive to an independent judiciary may seem to have adverse consequences. We conclude that cultural traits are of fundamental importance for the quality of formal institutions, even in societies as highly developed as the EU member states.

Keywords: judicial independence, EU Justice Scoreboard, informal institutions, culture

JEL Classification: H11, K40, O40, P51

Suggested Citation

Gutmann, Jerg and Voigt, Stefan, Judicial Independence in the EU – A Puzzle (May 4, 2017). Gutmann, Jerg; Voigt, Stefan (2017): Judicial Independence in the EU – A Puzzle, ILE Working Paper Series, No. 4, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2963028 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2963028

Jerg Gutmann (Contact Author)

University of Hamburg - Institute of Law and Economics ( email )

Johnsallee 35
Hamburg, 20148
Germany

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute) ( email )

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

Stefan Voigt

University of Hamburg - Institute of Law & Economics ( email )

Johnsallee 35
Hamburg, 20148
Germany
+49-40-428385782 (Phone)
+49-40-428386794 (Fax)

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

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