Anti-Corruption Regulation and Shareholder Value: Evidence from China
50 Pages Posted: 5 May 2017 Last revised: 16 Dec 2020
Date Written: December 16, 2020
We examine the impact of China’s 2012 anti-corruption campaign, which primarily targeted the excesses of government officials and SOE executives, on individual firms’ shareholder value. We find that the anti-corruption campaign had a negative impact on the shareholder value of publicly listed Chinese firms that sell luxury goods and services. The campaign also significantly curtailed the luxury goods and services consumption by the publicly listed SOEs relative to the publicly listed non-SOEs. However, the overall impact of the campaign on shareholder value is negative for the SOEs relative to the non-SOEs. There is also evidence that the impact of the campaign is permanent. Our findings illustrate the complexities in the effects of the campaign on the behavior of publicly listed SOEs.
Keywords: China; anti-corruption regulation; luxury goods and services; firm performance; event study
JEL Classification: K42, M40, N25, N45, O12
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation