Does Anti-Corruption Regulation Improve the Performance of State-Controlled Firms? Evidence from China

66 Pages Posted: 5 May 2017 Last revised: 21 Mar 2022

See all articles by Bin Ke

Bin Ke

National University of Singapore

Na Liu

The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shenzhen

Song Tang

Shanghai University of Finance and Economics - School of Accountancy; Shanghai University of Finance and Economics - Institute of Accounting and Finance

Date Written: March 19, 2022

Abstract

We examine the impact of China’s 2012 anti-corruption campaign, which targets the excesses of government officials and SOE executives, on the performance of publicly listed Chinese SOEs. Using publicly listed non-SOEs as a benchmark, we find that the campaign reduced the overall performance of publicly listed SOEs. We identify several channels for the performance effect of the campaign. While the campaign curtailed SOEs’ luxury goods and services consumption, it reduced SOE employees’ work effort and hence hurt SOEs’ revenue growth and operating efficiency. The performance impact of the campaign also appears permanent.

Keywords: anti-corruption regulation; luxury goods and services consumption; firm performance; SOEs; China

JEL Classification: K42, M40, N25, N45, O12

Suggested Citation

Ke, Bin and Liu, Na and Tang, Song, Does Anti-Corruption Regulation Improve the Performance of State-Controlled Firms? Evidence from China (March 19, 2022). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2963478 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2963478

Bin Ke (Contact Author)

National University of Singapore ( email )

Mochtar Riady Building, BIZ 1, #07-53
15 Kent Ridge Drive
Singapore, 119245
Singapore
+6566013133 (Phone)

Na Liu

The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shenzhen ( email )

Song Tang

Shanghai University of Finance and Economics - School of Accountancy ( email )

No. 777 Guoding Road, Shanghai
Shanghai, 200433
China
86-21-6590 4842 (Phone)

Shanghai University of Finance and Economics - Institute of Accounting and Finance ( email )

Shanghai, 200433
China
86-21-6590 4842 (Phone)

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