From Monetary to Non-Monetary Mechanism Design via Artificial Currencies

25 Pages Posted: 8 May 2017 Last revised: 22 Feb 2019

See all articles by Artur Gorokh

Artur Gorokh

Cornell University - Center for Applied Mathematics

Siddhartha Banerjee

Cornell University - School of Operations Research and Information Engineering

Krishnamurthy Iyer

University of Minnesota - Twin Cities - Department of Industrial and Systems Engineering

Date Written: February 19, 2019

Abstract

Non-monetary mechanisms for repeated allocation and decision-making are gaining widespread use in many real-world settings. Our aim in this work is to study the performance and incentive properties of simple mechanisms based on artificial currencies in such settings.To this end, we make the following contributions: For a general allocation setting, we provide two blackbox approaches to convert any one-shot monetary mechanism to a dynamic non-monetary mechanism using an artificial currency that simultaneously guarantee vanishing gains from non-truthful reporting over time, as well as vanishing losses in performance. The two mechanisms trade-off between their applicability and their computational and informational requirements. Furthermore, for settings with two agents, we show that a particular artificial currency mechanism also results in a vanishing price of anarchy.

Keywords: artificial currency, mechanism design, welfare, repeated allocation

Suggested Citation

Gorokh, Artur and Banerjee, Siddhartha and Iyer, Krishnamurthy, From Monetary to Non-Monetary Mechanism Design via Artificial Currencies (February 19, 2019). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2964082 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2964082

Artur Gorokh (Contact Author)

Cornell University - Center for Applied Mathematics ( email )

657 Rhodes Hall
Ithaca, NY 14853-3801
United States

Siddhartha Banerjee

Cornell University - School of Operations Research and Information Engineering ( email )

237 Rhodes Hall
Ithaca, NY 14853
United States

Krishnamurthy Iyer

University of Minnesota - Twin Cities - Department of Industrial and Systems Engineering ( email )

111 Church St SE
Minneapolis, MN 55455
United States

Here is the Coronavirus
related research on SSRN

Paper statistics

Downloads
347
Abstract Views
1,720
rank
94,160
PlumX Metrics